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Standing	on	the	Edge:	What	Type	of	‘Exclusive	Licensees’	Should	Be	
Able	to	Initiate	Patent	Infringement	Actions?	
Johnathon	Liddicoat,*	
Abstract	
In	 patent	 laws	 around	 the	world,	 exclusive	 licensees	 often	 have	 standing	 to	 initiate	 infringement	
actions	 if	 the	 relevant	 patentee(s)	 is	 also	 added	 to	 the	 suit.	 Australian	 patent	 legislation	 specifies	
that	exclusive	 licensees	have	this	power	and,	correspondingly,	 the	definition	of	 ‘exclusive	 licensee’	
clearly	 permits	 licensees	 to	 initiate	 infringement	 actions	 if	 they	 exclusively	 control	 the	 full	
complement	 of	 rights	 conferred	 by	 a	 patent.	 However,	 an	 important	 question	 remains:	 Does	 the	
definition	of	exclusive	licensee	include	licensees	that	exclusively	control	only	a	portion	of	the	rights	
conferred	by	a	patent	 (e.g.	 to	 import	and	sell	an	 invention	but	not	make	 it)?	The	Full	Court	of	 the	
Federal	Court	of	Australia	has,	through	legislative	interpretation,	recently	answered	this	question	in	
the	negative.	Arguably,	this	 interpretation	 is	correct	as	a	matter	of	statutory	construction,	but	 is	 it	
correct	as	a	matter	of	patent	policy?	This	article	examines	this	final	question	via	two	approaches:	(i)	
by	 extending	 the	 orthodox	 economic	 rationale	 for	 patents	 to	 the	 issue	 at	 hand,	 in	 particular	 by	
examining	 the	 role	 of	 exclusive	 licensing	 in	 market	 economies;	 and	 (ii)	 by	 evaluating	 the	 role	 of	
standing	for	exclusive	licensees	in	the	context	of	world	patent	harmonisation	and	the	corresponding	
approaches	in	the	UK	and	US.	
Key	 words:	 patent	 law;	 standing;	 exclusive	 licences;	 justifications	 for	 patent	 law;	 patent	 law	
harmonisation.	
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1. Introduction	
Standing	 is	a	 requirement	of	many	 legal	actions.	Essentially,	a	party	has	 to	 show	that	 they	have	a	
certain	 threshold	 of	 interest	 in	 a	 case	 before	 they	 will	 be	 eligible	 to	 litigate.	 Standing	 is	 often	
associated	with	 constitutional	 and	 administrative	 law	 actions;	 however,	 a	 recent	 series	 of	 judicial	
decisions	 addressing	 the	 issue	 have	 now	 arisen	 in	 Australian	 patent	 law,	 raising	 questions	 about	
whether	the	current	operation	of	the	law	is	desirable.	Like	patent	legislation	around	the	world,	the	
Australian	 legislation,	 the	 Patents	 Act	 1990	 (‘the	 Patents	 Act’),	 specifies	 various	 standing	
requirements	 for	 different	 actions.	 Standing	 to	 revoke	 a	 patent	 is	 open	 to	 any	 party,1	 as	 is	
opposition.2	In	contrast,	applications	for	relief	from	unjustified	threats	of	infringement	and	to	rectify	
the	Register	of	Patents	via	a	court	are	limited	to	‘aggrieved’	persons.3	The	focus	of	this	article	is	on	
standing	to	initiate	infringement	actions	by	exclusive	licensees	under	Sec.	120(1)	of	the	Patents	Act,	
which	is	also	known	in	patent	law	as	co-plaintiff	standing.		
Sec.	120(1)	of	the	Patents	Act	states,	‘infringement	proceedings	may	be	started	in	a	prescribed	court	
…	by	the	patentee	or	an	exclusive	licensee.’4	Relevantly,	‘patentee’	is	defined	as	‘the	person	for	the	
time	being	entered	in	the	Register	as	the	grantee	or	proprietor	of	a	patent’5	and	‘exclusive	licensee’	
means	‘a	licensee	under	a	licence	granted	by	the	patentee	and	conferring	on	the	licensee,	or	on	the	
licensee	 and	 persons	 authorised	 by	 the	 licensee,	 the	 right	 to	 exploit	 the	 patented	 invention	
throughout	the	patent	area	to	the	exclusion	of	the	patentee	and	all	other	persons.’6		
The	Australian	decisions	 alluded	 to	 above	have	highlighted	 issues	with	 the	definition	of	 ‘exclusive	
licensee’.	More	specifically,	controversy	surrounds	whether	an	exclusive	licensee	is	constituted	only	
by	a	party	who	controls	the	full	complement	of	rights	conferred	in	a	patent	—	hereafter,	this	type	of	
exclusive	 licence	will	be	referred	as	a	 ‘panoplied	exclusive	 licence’,	 in	reliance	on	the	etymological	
root	of	 ‘panoply’	 as	 a	 complete	 suit	 of	 armour.7	Or,	 in	 the	 alternative,	 the	definition	of	 ‘exclusive	
licensee’	also	includes	a	licensee	who	receives	exclusivity	to	a	partitioned	sphere	of	rights	in	a	patent	
(a	 ‘partitioned	 exclusive	 licence’).8	 Three	 variations	 of	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licences	 have	 been	
litigated	 in	Australia.	 The	 first,	 and	most	 litigated	 type,	arises	when	a	 licensee	exclusively	 controls	
																																								 																				
1	Sec.	138(1)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
2	Id.,	Sec.	59.	
3	Id.,	Secs.	128(1),	192.	
4	Id.,	Sec	120(1).	Other	non-statutory	mechanisms	to	obtain	standing	have	been	outlined	in	theory,	see,	Emory	University	v.	
Biochem	Pharma	Inc	(1998)	86	FCR	1,	10	Lindgren	J;	Uprising	Dragon	Ltd	v.	Benedict	Trading	&	Shipping	Pty	Ltd	(1987)	16	
FCR	93,	102	French	J.	
5	Sch.	1	(definition	of	‘patentee’)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).		
6	Id.,	Sch.	1	(definition	of	‘exclusive	licensee’)	(emphasis	added).	
7	Macquarie	Concise	Dictionary	(Online		20166th	ed,	Macquarie	Dictionary	Publishers,	2013).	
8	For	the	remainder	of	this	article,	unless	otherwise	indicated,	the	term	‘standing’	will	be	used	to	solely	refer	to	the	ability	
to	initiate	patent	infringement	actions.	
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less	than	the	full	list	of	‘activities’	specified	in	the	definition	of	‘exploit’.	The	definition	of	‘exploit’	is	
dealt	with	 in	more	detail	below,	however,	 in	short,	the	term	is	used	in	the	Patents	Act	to	describe	
the	exclusive	ability	of	rights	holders	to	buy,	sell,	import	etc.	the	invention.	9	Accordingly,	this	type	of	
licence	arises,	for	example,	when	a	licensee	has	the	exclusive	ability	to	import	and	sell	an	invention	
but	not	make	it.	The	second	type	arises	when	a	licensee	has	the	exclusive	right	to	exploit	a	patent	in	
a	 geographic	 area	 smaller	 than	 the	 ‘patent	 area’,10	 and	 the	 third	 occurs	when	 a	 licensee	 has	 the	
exclusive	 right	 to	 exploit	 a	 patent	 in	 a	 specific	 field	 of	 use.	 These	 three	 types	 of	 licences	 will	 be	
referred	 to	 as	 ‘activity-based	 exclusive	 licences’,	 ‘geographic	 exclusive	 licences’,	 and	 ‘field-of-use	
exclusive	licences’	respectively	(see	Fig.	1).11	
	
Fig.	1	Diagram	of	the	licences	analysed	in	this	article.	
The	 primary	 aim	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	 evaluate	 whether	 the	 standing	 requirements	 for	 exclusive	
licensees	under	the	Patents	Act	are	coherent	with	its	underpinnings,	and	if	not,	recommend	reform.	
There	 is	 sparse	 commentary	on	 standing	 in	Australian	patent	 law,	and	none	 that	engages	with	 its	
justifications	 or	 jurisprudential	 underpinnings.12	 Extrinsic	 material	 to	 the	 Patents	 Act	 has	 not	
addressed	the	issue	either	and,	until	a	spate	of	cases	in	the	last	10	years,	there	had	been	little	case	
law.13	In	2015,	the	Intellectual	Property	Committee	of	the	Business	Law	Section	of	the	Law	Council	of	
Australia	 wrote	 a	 submission	 to	 IP	 Australia	 (the	 Australian	 Government	 agency	 that	 administers	
intellectual	property	 rights)	addressing	standing	 for	exclusive	 licensees.14	This	 submission	 focussed	
on	 the	 adverse	 commercial	 ramifications	 of	 the	 extant	 law	 and	 compliance	 with	 Australia’s	
																																								 																				
9	These	actions	are	often	referred	to	as	individual	exclusive	rights,	for	example	the	‘exclusive	right	to	make’,	however,	the	
Full	Court	of	the	Federal	Court	of	Australia	has	recently	specified	that	these	are	not	rights	in	themselves	but	rather	
‘activities’	that	fall	under	the	right	of	‘exploit’,	see,	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Company	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(2015)	228	FCR	1,	33;	
Sec.	13(1),	sch	1	(definition	of	‘exploit’)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
10	Sec	13(3),	sch	1	(definition	of	‘patent	area’)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
11	Greene	(2012–2013),	uses	a	similar	nomenclature,	pp.	6–9.	
12	For	example,	see,	Meltzer	et	al	(2005),p.	40;	Aarons	(2005);	Liberman	(2005),	pp.	45–6.		
13	See,	Commonwealth,	Parliamentary	Debates,	Senate,	29	May	1990,	1271	(Robert	Ray);	Commonwealth,	Parliamentary	
Debates,	House	of	Representatives,	10	October	1990,	2565	(Simon	Crean);	Industrial	Property	Advisory	Committee,	
Patents,	Innovation	and	Competition	in	Australia	(Australian	Government	Publishing	Service,	Canberra,	1984);	Dufty	
(1983);	Explanatory	Memorandum,	Patents	Bill	1990	(Cth);	Statement	of	the	Minister	for	Science	(1986).	
14	Intellectual	Propery	Committee	of	the	Business	Law	Section	of	the	Law	Council	of	Australia	(2015).		
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obligations	 under	 the	 Australia-United	 States	 Free	 Trade	 Agreement,15	 it	 did	 not	 touch	 upon	 the	
justifications	 for	 patent	 law.	 As	 described	 in	 greater	 detail	 below,	 judicial	 decisions	 and	
commentaries	from	other	jurisdictions	have	made	inroads	into	the	question	addressed	in	this	article,	
but	none	have	dealt	with	 it	comprehensively.	As	a	result,	 it	 is	difficult	to	 judge	whether	Australian	
standing	requirements	meet	legislative	aims	or	are	consistent	with	patent	jurisprudence.		
This	 article	 develops	 an	 economic-based	 theory	 for	 exclusive	 licensees	 to	 initiate	 patent	
infringement	 actions	 based	 on	 orthodox	 justifications	 for	 patent	 law.	 Furthermore,	 to	 put	 the	
Australian	 position	 in	 a	 global	 context	 and	 consider	 the	 role	 of	 world	 patent	 harmonisation,	 this	
article	evaluates	the	standing	requirements	in	two	other	major	common	law	countries.		
This	article	is	divided	into	three	substantive	parts:	part	2	canvasses	relevant	Australian	case	law	and	
demonstrates	that,	in	the	absence	of	a	High	Court	decision	to	the	contrary,	only	panoplied	exclusive	
licensees	have	standing;	part	3	develops	an	economic-based	theory	for	standing	that	emphasises	the	
role	of	patents	as	economic	assets	in	market	economies	and	the	role	of	division	of	labour	in	bringing	
inventions	to	markets;	and	part	4	explores	standing	requirements	 for	exclusive	 licensees	 in	the	US	
and	 UK.	 This	 article	 concludes	 by	 observing	 that,	 consistent	 with	 patent	 jurisprudence	 and	
harmonisation	 efforts,	 standing	 should	 be	 broadened	 in	 Australia	 to	 include	 partitioned	 exclusive	
licensees.	
2. Australian	Law		
2.1. Preliminary	Aspects	to	Standing	in	Australian	Patent	Law	
To	put	the	issues	addressed	in	this	article	in	context,	it	is	first	necessary	to	outline	related	aspects	of	
standing	 in	Australian	patent	 law.	Patent	 licences,	 at	 their	most	basic,	 are	 a	 type	of	 contract	 that	
operates	as	a	mechanism	for	patentees	to	electively	permit	others	to	practise	their	invention.	Within	
the	 broad	 confines	 of	 laws	 relevant	 to	 licences,	 such	 as	 competition	 and	 contract	 law,	 patentees	
have	 freedom	 to	 contract.	 Thus,	 they	may	 include	 a	 variety	 of	 terms	 including	 those	 directed	 to	
panoplied	or	partitioned	exclusive	licences.	Sec.	120(2)	of	the	Patents	Act	specifies	that,	although	a	
patentee	may	begin	infringement	proceedings	alone,	when	an	exclusive	licensee	initiates	an	action,	
the	 patentee	 must	 be	 ‘joined	 as	 a	 defendant	 unless	 joined	 as	 a	 plaintiff’.16	 The	 Australian	 Law	
Reform	Commission,	 in	 their	 report	 on	 gene	 patents	 and	 human	health,	 stated	 that,	 in	 effect,	 an	
exclusive	licensee	‘stands	in	the	shoes	of	the	patent	holder,	subject	to	any	additional	terms	relating	
to	enforcement	of	patent	 rights	 in	 the	 licence	agreement	 (for	example,	allocation	of	any	damages	
awards,	 liability	 for	 the	 costs	 of	 any	 infringement	 proceedings,	 or	 the	 right	 to	 control	
																																								 																				
15	Id.,	p.	1.	
16	Sec	120(1)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
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proceedings)’.17	 It	 is	 also	 relevant	 to	 note	 that,	 Sec.	 120(3)	 of	 the	 Patents	 Act	 states	 that	 ‘[a]	
patentee	joined	as	a	defendant	is	not	liable	for	costs	unless	the	patentee	enters	an	appearance	and	
takes	part	in	the	proceedings.’18		
There	are	various	reasons	why	it	is	appropriate	for	patentees	to	be	joined	in	actions	initiated	by	their	
exclusive	licensees,	including	that	it	makes	them	bound	by	the	judgment,	avoids	res	judicata	issues,	
gives	them	an	opportunity	to	be	heard,	and	allows	discovery	of	documents	that	may	affect	validity,	
infringement,	or	the	licensee’s	standing.19	Due	to	circumstance,	however,	an	exclusive	licensee	may	
not	want	to	enter	a	plea	because	they	may	have	no	interest	in	the	case	that	is	being	pursued	by	the	
licensee.	Such	a	situation	could	arise,	for	example,	if	a	patentee	licenses	a	patent	in	return	for	lump	
sum	payments	not	 linked	 to	 the	 success	of	 the	product	 protected	by	 the	patent.	 In	 this	 scenario,	
they	will	receive	payments	regardless	of	any	enforcement.	
Sec.	187	of	the	Patents	Act	requires	that	licences,	assignments	and	other	particulars	of	patents	must	
be	 registered.20	 In	 Stack	 v	 Brisbane	 City	 Council	 (No	 2),21	 Drummond	 J	 held	 that	 the	 combined	
interpretation	of	Secs.	120	and	187	meant	that	an	unregistered	assignee	could	not	ordinarily	bring	
an	 infringement	 action	 in	 their	 own	 name.22	 However,	 the	 position	 is	 different	 for	 exclusive	
licensees:	 in	 Grant	 v	 Australian	 Temporary	 Fencing	 Pty	 Ltd,23	 Holmes	 J	 held	 that	 because	 the	
definition	of	‘exclusive	licensee’	does	not	include	a	reference	to	registration,	it	 is	not	necessary	for	
an	exclusive	licensee	to	be	registered	for	them	to	initiate	infringement	actions.24		
Three	 further	 ancillary	 aspects	 of	 licences	 should	 be	 noted.	 First,	 parties	 to	 a	 licence	 cannot	
retrospectively	 change	 the	 rights	 and	 obligations	 between	 them.25	 This	 means	 that	 a	 contract	
written	as	a	non-exclusive	 licence	and	which	operates	as	one,	cannot	be	amended	to	state	that	at	
any	time	in	the	past	it	operated	as	an	exclusive	licence.	Second,	whether	a	licence	is	sole,	exclusive,	
non-exclusive,	 or	 actually	 an	 assignment,	 will	 be	 determined	 by	 a	 court	 regardless	 of	 its	 title.26	
Generally	speaking,	this	assessment	will	be	based	on	rights	conferred,	wording	of	the	contract	and	
																																								 																				
17	Australian	Law	Reform	Commission	(2004)	vol.	1,	p.	230	n.	62.		
18	Sec.	120(3)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
19	Rule	20.13	Federal	Court	Rules	2011	(Cth);	the	application	of	joinder	rules,	Rules	9.02–9.05	Federal	Court	Rules	2011	
(Cth),	are	consider	in	more	detail	below.		
20	Sec.	187(1)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth);	Reg.	19.1(1)	Patent	Regulations	1991	(Cth).	
21	Stack	v.	Brisbane	City	Council	(No	2)	(1996)	67	FCR	510.	
22	Stack	v.	Brisbane	City	Council	(No	2)	(1996)	67	FCR	510,	513;	see	also	Townsend	Controls	Pty	Ltd	v.	Gilead	(1989)	16	IPR	
469,	471–2	van	Doussa	J.	
23	Grant	v.	Australian	Temporary	Fencing	Pty	Ltd	(2003)	59	IPR	170.	
24	Grant	v	Australian	Temporary	Fencing	Pty	Ltd	(2003)	59	IPR	170,	179–80.	It	is	also	relevant	to	note	that	s	195	of	the	
Patents	Act	states	that	‘[t]he	Register	is	prima	facie	evidence	of	any	particular	registered	in	it.’	Thus,	registration	of	an	
exclusive	licence	may	make	it	easier	for	an	exclusive	licensee	to	initiate	an	infringement	action,	particularly	if	an	alleged	
infringer	is	likely	to	contest	their	ability	to	bring	the	infringement	action.	
25	Black	&	Decker	Inc	v.	GMCA	Pty	Ltd	(No	2)	(2008)	76	IPR	99,	125	Heerey	J.	
26	For	example	see,	Reid	v.	Moreland	Timber	Company	Pty	Ltd	(1946)	73	CLR	1;	Re	An	Application	by	the	Preformed	Line	
Products	Company	for	an	Extension	of	Letters	Patent	No	160999	[1971]	ALJR	6,	8.	
	 7	
the	objective	intention	of	the	parties.27	Third,	eligibility	for	financial	relief	is	limited	to	time	periods	
in	which	parties	have	standing.28	
2.2. Standing	to	Initiate	Patent	Infringement	Suits	Under	the	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth)	
The	first	federal	Australian	patent	legislation,	the	Patents	Act	1903,	contained	no	statutory	standing	
provision	for	exclusive	licensees.	Statutory	standing	for	exclusive	licensees	was	introduced	into	the	
Patents	Act	1952,	and	the	contemporary	standing	 interpretation	 issues	 in	Australia	begin	under	 it.	
Sec.	 114(1)	 of	 the	 Patents	 Act	 1952	 specified	 that	 an	 ‘exclusive	 licensee	 may	 bring	 an	 action	 or	
proceeding	for	the	infringement	of	a	patent’.29	‘Exclusive	licensee’	was	defined	to	mean	‘a	licensee	
under	 a	 licence	 granted	 by	 the	 patentee	 which	 confers	 on	 the	 licensee,	 or	 on	 the	 licensee	 and	
persons	 authorised	 by	 him,	 the	 right	 to	 make,	 use,	 exercise	 and	 vend	 the	 patented	 invention,	
throughout	 Australia,	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 all	 other	 persons,	 including	 the	 patentee.’30	 For	 reasons	
that	will	become	apparent	below,	it	is	convenient	to	note	that	the	exclusive	rights	conferred	under	
Sec.	69	of	the	Patents	Act	1952	were	to	‘make,	use,	exercise	and	vend	the	invention…’.31		
In	 the	 1963	 case,	 Ex	 parte	 British	 Nylon	 Spinners	 (‘British	 Nylon	 Spinners’),32	 the	 High	 Court	 of	
Australia33	 was	 asked	 to	 determine	 whether	 either	 of	 the	 two	 licensee	 applicants	 qualified	 as	
exclusive	 licensees	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 patent	 term	 extension.34	 Under	 Sec.	 95	 of	 the	 Patents	 Act	
1952,	 only	 exclusive	 licensees	 and	 patentees	 could	 apply	 for	 an	 extension,	 and	 the	 definition	 of	
exclusive	 licensee	was	 the	 same	 for	 patent	 term	extension	 as	 it	was	 for	 standing.35	 The	patent	 in	
question	related	to	an	‘improved	process	for	melt-spinning	nylon	yarn’.36	The	contract	with	the	first	
licensee	exclusively	allowed	the	 licensee	to	 ‘make,	use,	exercise	and	vend’	the	 invention	when	the	
filament	of	 yarn	was	 .09	mm	or	 less37	—	a	 field-of-use	exclusive	 licence.	 The	 second	 licensee	was	
permitted	 to	 control	 all	 the	 rights	 in	 the	 patent	 subject	 to	 the	 first	 licensee’s	 rights.38	 The	 Court	
found	 that	 since	 neither	 of	 the	 licensees	 could	 enforce	 the	 patent	 to	 the	 ‘exclusion	 of	 all	 other	
																																								 																				
27	See	generally,	Reid	v.	Moreland	Timber	Company	Pty	Ltd	(1946)	73	CLR	1;	Re	An	Application	by	the	Preformed	Line	
Products	Company	for	an	Extension	of	Letters	Patent	No	160999	[1971]	ALJR	6,	8;	KD	Kanopy	Australasia	Pty	Ltd	v.	Insta	
Image	Pty	Ltd	(2007)	71	IPR	615,	637–8.	
28	Black	&	Decker	Inc	v.	GMCA	Pty	Ltd	(No	2)	(2008)	76	IPR	99,	127	Heerey	J	discussing	Colbeam	Palmer	Ltd	v	Stock	Affiliates	
Pty	Ltd	(1968)	112	CLR	25,	36,	41	(Windeyer	J).	
29	Sect.	114(1)	Patents	Act	1952	(Cth).	
30	Id.,	Sec.	6	(definition	of	‘exclusive	licensee’).	
31	Id.,Sec.	69.	
32	Ex	parte	British	Nylon	Spinners	Ltd;	Re	Imperial	Chemical	Industries	Ltd’s	Patent	(1963)	109	CLR	336.	
33	The	High	Court	of	Australia	is	higest	court	in	the	Australian	judicial	system.	
34	Ex	parte	British	Nylon	Spinners	Ltd;	Re	Imperial	Chemical	Industries	Ltd’s	Patent	(1963)	109	CLR	336,	338–9.	
35	Ibid;	Sec.	95	Patents	Act	1952	(Cth).	
36	Ex	parte	British	Nylon	Spinners	Ltd;	Re	Imperial	Chemical	Industries	Ltd’s	Patent	(1963)	109	CLR	336,	336.	
37	Ibid.	
38	Ex	parte	British	Nylon	Spinners	Ltd;	Re	Imperial	Chemical	Industries	Ltd’s	Patent	(1963)	109	CLR	336,	337.	
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persons’,	neither	were	‘exclusive	licensees’	for	the	purpose	of	the	Act	and	therefore	neither	had	the	
ability	to	make	the	extension	of	term	application.39		
Field-of-use	licences	have	not	been	specifically	addressed	in	recent	case	law.	However,	in	addressing	
the	questions	of	whether	activity-based	exclusive	 licensees	or	 geographic	exclusive	 licensees	have	
standing	under	the	Patents	Act,	 recent	cases	have	revisited	British	Nylon	Spinners	and	emphasised	
its	 importance.	 These	 cases	 begin	 with	 Grant	 v	 Australian	 Temporary	 Fencing	 Pty	 Ltd.	 Before	
analysing	 the	 case	 law	 though,	 it	 is	 first	 necessary	 to	 note	 the	 definition	 of	 ‘exploit’	 under	 the	
Patents	Act:	
in	relation	to	an	invention	it	includes:	
(a)	where	the	invention	is	a	product--make,	hire,	sell	or	otherwise	dispose	of	the	product,	offer	to	
make,	sell,	hire	or	otherwise	dispose	of	it,	use	or	import	it,	or	keep	it	for	the	purpose	of	doing	any	of	
those	things;	or	
(b)	where	the	invention	is	a	method	or	process--use	the	method	or	process	or	do	any	act	mentioned	
in	paragraph	(a)	in	respect	of	a	product	resulting	from	such	use.40	
In	Grant	v	Australian	Temporary	Fencing	Pty	Ltd,	the	defendant	sought	summary	judgment	on	their	
counter	 claim	 to	 infringement	 and	 defence.41	 Amongst	 the	 defendant’s	 arguments	 was	 that	 the	
licensee	 did	 not	 satisfy	 the	 definition	 of	 ‘exclusive	 licensee’	 under	 the	 Patents	 Act	 because	 the	
licence	did	not	confer	all	 the	activities	 in	the	definition	of	 ‘exploit’.	More	precisely,	 the	 licence	did	
not	confer	the	ability	to	import	products.42	In	her	Honour’s	decision,	Holmes	J	noted	that	the	rights	
conferred	 by	 a	 patent	 had	 changed	 between	 the	 Patents	 Act	 1952	 and	 the	 Patents	 Act;	 more	
specifically,	 patent	 rights	 were	 exhaustively	 listed	 in	 the	 Patents	 Act	 1952,	 whereas	 they	 are	
inclusively	defined	in	the	Patents	Act.43	In	light	of	these	differences,	her	Honour	raised	the	possibility	
that	 the	 Patents	 Act	 could	 be	 read	 to	 convey	 standing	 on	 a	 ‘plurality’	 of	 exclusive	 licensees.44	
However,	Holmes	J	did	not	decide	the	case	on	this	point;	rather,	her	Honour	found	that	the	licence	
in	question	was	actually	a	panoplied	exclusive	licence.	Holmes	J	reasoned	that	because	the	definition	
of	 ‘exploit’	 under	 the	 Patents	 Act	 is	 not	 exhaustive,	 for	 a	 licence	 to	 be	 exclusive,	 it	 need	 not	
exhaustively	list	all	of	the	activities	under	the	definition	of	exploit	and,	therefore,	that	the	failure	to	
include	a	right	to	import	in	the	licence,	which	neither	of	the	parties	may	have	contemplated,	was	not	
																																								 																				
39	Ex	parte	British	Nylon	Spinners	Ltd;	Re	Imperial	Chemical	Industries	Ltd’s	Patent	(1963)	109	CLR	336,	340.	
40	Sch	1	(definition	of	‘exploit’)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
41	Grant	v.	Australian	Temporary	Fencing	Pty	Ltd	(2003)	59	IPR	170,	171–2.	
42	Grant	v.	Australian	Temporary	Fencing	Pty	Ltd	(2003)	59	IPR	170,	180.	
43	Grant	v.	Australian	Temporary	Fencing	Pty	Ltd	(2003)	59	IPR	170,	182.	
44	Ibid.	
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necessarily	fatal	to	it	being	exclusive.45	Moreover,	in	assessing	the	licence	itself,	Holmes	J	found	that	
because	 it	 left	 no	 residual	 rights	 to	 the	 licensor,	 referred	 to	 it	 as	 being	 exclusive,	 and	 included	 a	
provision	 to	 reduce	 the	 licence	 to	 a	 non-exclusive	 one,46	 that,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 summary	
judgment,	the	licence	was	a	panoplied	exclusive	licence	and	therefore	the	plaintiff	had	standing.47	
In	Pharmacia	Italia	SpA	v	Interpharma	Pty	Ltd,48	a	licensee	sought	an	interlocutory	injunction	against	
the	 respondent	 for	 importing	 an	 anti-tumour	 drug.49	 The	 respondent	 argued	 that	 the	 applicant	
lacked	 standing	 to	 bring	 the	 action	 because	 they	 failed	 to	 satisfy	 the	 definition	 of	 an	 ‘exclusive	
licensee’.	 Prior	 to	 the	 applicant	 obtaining	 their	 licence,	which	was	 purported	 to	 be	 exclusive,	 the	
patentee	 granted	 a	 licence	 to	 another	 party,	which	 remained	on	 foot.50	 Sundberg	 J	 engaged	with	
Holmes	 J’s	 idea	 of	 multiple	 exclusive	 licences	 under	 Sec.	 120,	 and	 held	 that,	 based	 on	 this,	 the	
licensee	had	‘an	arguable	case’	that	it	had	standing	to	initiate	proceedings.51		
In	 Bristol-Myers	 Squibb	 Co	 v	 Apotex	 Pty	 Ltd	 (No	 5),52	 the	 first	 applicant	 was	 the	 commercialising	
company	 in	 Australia	 for	 the	 drug	 aripiprazole,	 and	 the	 second	 applicant	 was	 the	 patentee	 and	
global	manufacturer	of	the	drug.53	The	licence	agreement	between	the	applicants	specified	that	the	
first	applicant	was	the	‘exclusive	licensee’,	but	it	also	reserved	the	right	to	manufacture	aripiprazole	
to	the	second	applicant.54	The	respondent,	who	was	contesting	an	infringement	claim,55	argued	that	
the	 first	applicant	was	not	an	 ‘exclusive	 licensee’	because	 it	 could	not	exclusively	exercise	 the	 full	
range	of	activities	under	the	definition	of	‘exploit’.56	Being	the	first	full	hearing	to	decide	the	issue,	
Yates	 J	 reviewed	 the	 authorities,	 in	 particular,	 British	 Nylon	 Spinners,	 Pharmacia	 Italia	 SpA	 v	
Interpharma	Pty	Ltd	and	Grant	v	Australian	Temporary	Fencing	Pty	Ltd,	and	rejected	Holmes	J’s	idea	
of	multiple	exclusive	licensees.57	Yates	J	stated	that	Sec.	13(1)	of	the	Patents	Act	provides	the	‘twin	
rights’58	of	exploitation	and	authorisation	and	‘that	the	definition	of	‘exclusive	licensee’	operates	in	
harmony	with	 the	 rights	 conferred	by	 the	Act	on	 the	patentee.59	 Consistent	with	 this,	 his	Honour	
stated	that	the	Patents	Act	‘speaks	of	"the	right	to	exploit"	the	invention	as	a	single,	indivisible	right,	
																																								 																				
45	Grant	v.	Australian	Temporary	Fencing	Pty	Ltd	(2003)	59	IPR	170,	182-3.	
46	Ibid.	
47	Ibid.	
48	Pharmacia	Italia	SpA	v.	Interpharma	Pty	Ltd	(2005)	67	IPR	397.	
49	Pharmacia	Italia	SpA	v.	Interpharma	Pty	Ltd	(2005)	67	IPR	397,	398–9.	
50	Pharmacia	Italia	SpA	v.	Interpharma	Pty	Ltd	(2005)	67	IPR	397,	400.	
51	Pharmacia	Italia	SpA	v.	Interpharma	Pty	Ltd	(2005)	67	IPR	397,	402.	
52	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(No	5)	(2013)	104	IPR	23.	
53	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(No	5)	(2013)	104	IPR	23,	103.	
54	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(No	5)	(2013)	104	IPR	23,	102–3.	
55	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(No	5)	(2013)	104	IPR	23,	26.	
56	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(No	5)	(2013)	104	IPR	23,	101.	
57	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(No	5)	(2013)	104	IPR	23,	101,	105.	
58	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(No	5)	(2013)	104	IPR	23,	105.	
59	Ibid.	
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and	 that	 the	 word	 "exploit"	 is	 used	 in	 the	 Act	 as	 a	 hypernym	 to	 cover	 a	 range	 of	 activities.’60	
Expanding	further	on	this	reasoning,	Yates	J	continued	that:		
[the]	use	of	disjunctive	language	in	the	definition	of	‘exploit’	to	identify	particular	activities	falling	
within	the	scope	of	the	term	does	not	create	separate	rights	with	respect	to	those	activities.	It	merely	
recognises	that	the	right	to	exploit	covers	a	range	of	activities,	any	one	of	which,	if	undertaken,	would	
amount	to	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	exploit.61	
Yates	 J	 also	 found	 that	 this	 reasoning	was	 consistent	with	 the	High	 Court	 of	 Australia’s	 finding	 in	
British	Nylon	Spinners.	On	this	point	his	Honour	stated	that	‘the	essential	reasoning	of	the	High	Court	
in	British	Nylon	Spinners	with	respect	to	the	meaning	of	"exclusive	licensee"	in	s	6	of	the	1952	Act:	
[was	that]	the	patentee	has	conferred	on	the	licensee,	exclusively,	the	exercise	of	the	rights	that	the	
patentee	 itself	 has	 been	 granted	 under	 the	 patent.’62	 Further,	 regardless	 of	 the	 replacement	 of	
‘make,	use,	exercise	and	vend’	with	‘exploit’	between	the	1952	and	1990	Acts,	his	Honour	concluded	
that	this	does	not	change	the	fact	that	‘the	definition	of	"exclusive	licensee"	in	each	Act	refers	to	the	
conferral	by	 the	patentee	of	a	single	 licence	that	precludes	the	patentee,	and	any	person	deriving	
authority	 from	 the	 patentee,	 from	 exercising	 the	 rights	 granted	 by	 the	 patent.’63	 Accordingly,	 his	
Honour	found	that	because	the	first	applicant	did	not	have	the	right	to	manufacture	aripiprazole,	it	
did	not	have	standing.64	On	appeal	to	the	Full	Court	of	the	Federal	Court	of	Australia	in	Bristol-Myers	
Squibb	Co	v	Apotex	Pty	Ltd,65	Besanko,	Jagot	and	Nicolas	JJs	unanimously	found	no	error	in	Yates	J’s	
reasoning,	and	quoted	his	Honour’s	judgment	at	length.66	
From	the	Full	Court’s	reasoning	in	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v	Apotex	Pty	Ltd,	it	is	reasonable	to	infer	
that	 exclusive	 geographic	 licences	 are	 unlikely	 to	 confer	 standing	 because	 the	 ‘indivisible	 right	 of	
exploit’	 would	 be	 divided.	 The	 case	 of	 KD	 Kanopy	 Australasia	 Pty	 Ltd	 v	 Insta	 Image	 Pty	 Ltd	 (‘KD	
Kanopy’),67	which	was	decided	before	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(No	5),	is	consistent	
with	this	reasoning.	The	case,	however,	warrants	further	scrutiny	because	it	raises	an	aspect	of	the	
law	not	yet	detailed.	In	this	case,	the	licence	in	question	conferred	exclusive	control	of	the	patent	in	
issue	 to	 everywhere	 in	 Australia	 except	 the	 state	 of	 New	 South	 Wales	 –	 a	 geographic	 exclusive	
																																								 																				
60	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(No	5)	(2013)	104	IPR	23,	106.	
61	Ibid.	
62	Ibid.	
63	Ibid.	
64	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(No	5)	(2013)	104	IPR	23,	106–7;	see	also,	Blue	Gentian	LLC	v.	Product	
Management	Group	Pty	Ltd	(2014)	110	IPR	453,	486–8.	
65	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(2015)	228	FCR	1.	
66	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(2015)	228	FCR	1,	28–33.	For	other	decisions	consistent	with	this	rationale,	see	
also,	GlaxoSmithKline	Consumer	Healthcare	Investments	(Ireland	(No	2)	Ltd	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	[2016]	FCA	608	(31	May	2016)	
[589]–[599];	Actavis	Pty	Ltd	v.	Orion	Corporation	[2016]	FCAFC	12	(9	September	2016)	[194]–[253].	
67	KD	Kanopy	Australasia	Pty	Ltd	v.	Insta	Image	Pty	Ltd	(2007)	71	IPR	615.	
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licence.68	Since	the	Patents	Act	defines	an	exclusive	licensee	to	be	one	that	has	‘the	right	to	exploit	
the	patented	 invention	 throughout	 the	patent	area	 to	 the	exclusion	of	 the	patentee	and	all	other	
persons’,	and	‘patent	area’	is	defined	to	include	Australia	and	the	Australian	continental	shelf,69		the	
respondent	 argued	 that	 the	 licensee	 did	 not	 have	 standing.70	 On	 a	 close	 reading	 of	 this	 case	 it	
appears	that	Kiefel	J	would	have	ordinarily	found	that	the	applicant	did	not	have	standing;	however,	
evidence	 presented	 to	 the	 Court	 persuaded	 her	 Honour	 to	 find	 that	 an	 oral	 amendment	 had	
conferred	exclusive	rights	on	the	licensee	across	the	entire	patent	area.	Accordingly,	Kiefel	J	found	
that	the	licensee	had	standing	from	the	date	of	the	amendment.71	
In	all,	the	effect	of	the	decisions	discussed	in	this	part	is	that,	in	the	absence	of	a	High	Court	decision	
to	the	contrary,	only	licensees	with	a	panoplied	exclusive	licence	have	standing	under	Sec.	120(1).		
3. Jurisprudence	&	Justifications	
This	part	 is	 divided	 into	 four	 sections:	 the	 first	 addresses	economic-based	 justifications	 for	patent	
law	 as	 applied	 to	 standing	 to	 initiate	 infringement	 suits;	 the	 second	 considers	 other	 related	 legal	
aspects	 of	 standing;	 the	 third	 analyses	 arguments	 against	 standing	 for	 partitioned	 exclusive	
licensees;	and	the	fourth	summarises	the	discussion	in	this	section.	
3.1. Economic	Reasoning	
In	an	article	by	Professors	Roger	Blair	and	Thomas	Cotter,	the	authors	outline	economic	justifications	
for	 standing	 in	 intellectual	 property	 law	 but	 do	 not	 comprehensively	 address	 standing	 for	
partitioned	exclusive	 licensees.72	This	article	extends	their	 reasoning.	At	 the	beginning	of	Blair	and	
Cotter’s	analysis,	the	authors	outline	three	assumptions	that	are	also	adopted	here.73	First,	the	main	
contemporary	 justification	 underpinning	 patent	 law	 is	 that	 the	 conferral	 of	 exclusive	 rights	 in	
inventions	 incentivises	 innovation	 and	 is	 welfare	 enhancing.74	 Blair	 and	 Cotter	 note	 that	 this	
justification	is	open	to	some	doubt.75	They	also	acknowledge,	however,	that	whether	patent	regimes	
have	 a	 net	 positive	 effect	 is	 a	 complex	 question	without	 a	 definitive	 answer.76	 As	 the	 aim	of	 this	
article	 is	 to	 evaluate	 whether	 standing	 for	 exclusive	 licensees	 is	 consistent	 with	 orthodox	
justifications	for	patents,	it	will	proceed	under	this	assumption	too.		
																																								 																				
68	KD	Kanopy	Australasia	Pty	Ltd	v.	Insta	Image	Pty	Ltd	(2007)	71	IPR	615,	636–7.	
69	Sch.	1	(definition	of	‘patent	area’)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
70	KD	Kanopy	Australasia	Pty	Ltd	v.	Insta	Image	Pty	Ltd	(2007)	71	IPR	615,	636.	
71	KD	Kanopy	Australasia	Pty	Ltd	v.	Insta	Image	Pty	Ltd	(2007)	71	IPR	615,	638–9.	
72	Blair	and	Cotter	(1999–2000),	p.	1323.	
73	Id.,	pp.	1330–6.	
74	Id.,	pp.	1330–5.	
75	Id.,	pp.	1332–5.	
76	Id.,	pp.	1333–5.		
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Blair	 and	 Cotter’s	 second	 assumption	 is	 that	 the	 ability	 to	 transfer	 exclusive	 patent	 rights	 is	 also	
generally	welfare	enhancing.	The	authors	note	that	this	assumption	is	‘not	immune	from	criticism’,77	
and	that	the	validity	of	this	second	assumption	is	difficult	to	measure	in	practice,	but	the	evidence	of	
transferring	patent	rights	being	problematic	is	limited.78	They	also	argue	that	even	if	it	was	a	genuine	
issue,	 it	 would	 be	 confined	 to	 certain	 industries	 in	 certain	 time	 periods	 and	 therefore	 would	
probably	be	better	addressed	elsewhere	than	in	standing	law.79		
Beyond	Blair	and	Cotter’s	analysis	of	this	second	assumption,	further	support	can	be	found	for	it	in	
application	 of	 fundamental	 economic	 principles.	 In	 the	 background	 of	 patent	 law	 is	 the	 broad	
structure	of	 a	 free	market	 economy,	which	 is	 based	upon	 the	 assumption	 that,	 in	 the	 absence	of	
market	failure,	it	will	efficiently	allocate	resources.80	Key	features	of	market	economies,	relevant	to	
the	 analysis	 here,	 include,	 division	 of	 labour,	 decentralised	 decision	 making,	 and	 Adam	 Smith’s	
‘invisible	hand’.	 ‘Division	of	 labour’	 refers	 to	 the	development	of	 specialised	 skill	 sets	 for	 efficient	
production	 of	 goods.	 As	 Adam	 Smith,	 the	 father	 of	 modern	 economics,	 observed,	 ‘the	 greatest	
improvement	 in	 the	 productive	 powers	 of	 labour,	 and	 the	 greater	 part	 of	 the	 skill,	 dexterity,	 and	
judgment	 with	 which	 it	 is	 anywhere	 directed,	 or	 applied,	 seem	 to	 have	 been	 the	 effects	 of	 the	
division	 of	 labour.’81	 ‘Decentralised	 decision	 making’,	 as	 it	 is	 used	 here,	 refers	 to	 the	 ability	 of	
individual	actors	to	decide	on	how	to	manage	property.	It	is	critical	to	Adam	Smith’s	‘invisible	hand,’	
which,	 as	 it	 is	 commonly	 understood,	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 social	 benefits	 arise	 from	 self-motivated	
individual	 actions	 and	 trade.82	 Thus,	 it	makes	 sense	 for	 patentees	 to	 have	 the	 benefit	 of	 electing	
between,	or	using	a	mix	of,	commercialising	themselves,	assigning	their	rights,	and	licensing	parties	
to	exploit	their	invention	to	enable	them	to	participate	in	the	broader	market	economy	and	realise	
efficient	utilisation	of	their	invention.		
The	utility	of	transferring	patent	rights	has	also	been	empirically	observed.	Statistics	from	a	recent	
survey	 of	 Australian	 inventors	 shows	 that	 of	 2689	 respondents	 who	 had	 a	 pending	 or	 granted	
patent,	over	43%	reported	that	attempts	were	made	to	licence	or	sell	their	invention.83	There	is	no	
doubt	 that	 some	 technology	 is	 licensed	 or	 sold	 because	 patentees	 want	 to	 move	 on	 to	 other	
projects.	In	general,	however,	the	reality	is	that	quite	often	patentees	do	not	have	the	expertise	to	
take	 an	 invention	 from	 concept	 to	 market.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 new	 revelation.	 In	 industries,	 such	 as	
biotechnology	 and	 pharmaceuticals,	 few	 companies	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 conceive	 an	 invention,	
																																								 																				
77	See,	Id.,	p.	1335	and	references	therein.		
78	Ibid.	
79	Id.,pp.	1335–6.	
80	Merges	et	al.	(2012),	pp.	11–3;	Industrial	Property	Advisory	Committee	(1984),	pp.	11–18;	Economic	Planning	Advisory	
Council	(1989),	pp.		5–6;	Williams	(1989),	pp.	13–16;		Liddicoat	(2014),	pp.	21–2.	
81	Smith	(1776)	vol	1,	p	8,	more	generally	see,	chs.	1–3.	
82	Id.,	vol	IV,	349;	Gans	et	al.	(2003),	pp.	9–10;	Pol	and	Carroll	(	2005)	ch.	2.	
83	Nicol	et	al.	(2014)	p.	48;	see	also,	Jensen	et	al.	(2011).	
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reduce	 it	 to	 practice,	 create	 a	 prototype,	 receive	 funding,	 create	 appropriate	 business	 structures,	
and	 then	market	 and	 distribute	 a	 product.84	 These	 areas	 of	 expertise,	 of	which	 others	 also	 exist,	
provide	 an	 illustration	 of	 the	 division	 of	 labour	 that	 exists	 in	 modern	 innovation.	 Accordingly,	
without	compelling	evidence	 to	 the	contrary,	 it	 is	 relatively	easy	 to	subscribe	 to	Blair	and	Cotter’s	
second	assumption.	
The	first	two	assumptions	lead	naturally	to	the	third,	that	patent	rights	should	not	have	their	value	
diminished	 based	 on	 the	 way	 they	 are	 transferred.85	 Two	 key	 considerations	 underpinning	 this	
assumption	are	 that	 although	exclusive	patent	 rights	 are	an	exception	 to	a	 free	market	economy,	
upon	 their	 creation,	patentees	must	 choose	how	they	are	 to	be	exploited	and,	patented	products	
often	directly	compete	with	other	substitutable	products.86	If	patents	are	welfare	enhancing	because	
of	the	exclusive	rights	they	offer	then,	consistent	with	the	operation	of	market	economies,87	parties	
holding	exclusive	rights	should	be	able	to	choose	how	to	enforce	them.	In	short,	 if	exclusive	rights	
are	to	operate	as	 incentives,	the	exclusive	nature	of	the	rights	must	be	enforceable,	otherwise	the	
value	 of	 them	 is	 reduced.88	 On	 this	 basis,	 Blair	 and	 Cotter	 conclude	 that	 panoplied	 exclusive	
licensees	and	patentees	should,	by	default,	have	standing	so	that	they	can	protect	their	interests	in	
any	 exclusive	 rights.89	 For	 patentees	 in	 a	 licence	 agreement,	 the	 interest	 protected	 is	 any	
reversionary	interest	and	any	royalty	stream	that	may	accrue	through	continuing	royalty	payments.	
For	 panoplied	 exclusive	 licensees,	 the	 interested	 protected	 is	 the	 exclusivity	 for	 which	 they	
bargained.90	
As	 explored	 in	 part	 2	 of	 this	 article,	 current	 Australian	 standing	 law	 for	 patentees	 and	 panoplied	
exclusive	licensees	aligns	with	Blair	and	Cotter’s	rationale	by	conferring	standing	on	them.	Although	
Australian	law	does	not	currently	confer	standing	on	partitioned	exclusive	licensees,	whether	or	not	
this	 position	 is	 consistent	with	 justifications	 for	 patent	 law	 is	more	 complex	 than	 simply	 applying	
Blair	and	Cotter’s	 rationale.	There	are	significant	differences	between	panoplied	exclusive	 licences	
and	partitioned	exclusive	 licences,	and	these	differences	must	be	explored	to	assess	whether	Blair	
and	Cotter’s	assumptions	hold.		
To	begin	with,	it	is	helpful	to	consider	whether	non-exclusive	licensees	should	have	standing.	Patent	
rights,	by	their	definition,	are	negative	exclusionary	rights,	carrying	no	right	to	exploit	the	invention,	
																																								 																				
84	For	an	exploration	in	the	Australian	drug	discovery	and	development	sector	see,	Nicol	et	al.	(2014)	pp.	48,	49–50,	57–65,	
76–80,	84–6,	87–9.	
85	Blair	and	Cotter	(1999–2000),	p.	1336.	
86	Cotter	(1999),	pp.	28–34.	
87	Gans	et	al.	(2004),	pp.	437–8.	
88	Id.,	pp.	437–9.		
89	Blair	and	Cotter	(1999–2000),	pp.	1392–6.	
90	Id.,	pp.	1394–7.	
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only	 to	exclude	others	 from	exploiting	 it.91	When	a	non-exclusive	 licence	 is	 granted,	 the	patentee	
agrees	 not	 to	 exercise	 patent	 rights	 against	 the	 licensee,	 and	 the	 patentee	 retains	 the	 option	 to	
licence,	 or	 commercialise	 the	 invention	 in	 any	 other	 applicable	 manner.	 Thus,	 if	 a	 non-exclusive	
licensee	 had	 standing	 to	 initiate	 infringement,	 this	would	 derogate	 from	 the	 patentee’s	 ability	 to	
choose	 how	 to	 exploit	 their	 invention,	 and	 therefore	 the	 rights	 they	 have	 been	 granted.	
Furthermore,	 a	 non-exclusive	 licensee	 has	 not	 been	 promised	 any	 exclusivity	 to	 exercise	 an	
invention,	 and	 to	 obtain	 this	 they	 would,	 usually,	 have	 had	 to	 pay	 more.	 Thus,	 although	 a	 non-
exclusive	 licensee	may	suffer	economic	harm	resulting	 from	 infringement	of	 the	patent	rights	 that	
they	have	paid	to	practise,	the	law	does	not	confer	them	standing.	
This	reasoning	resonates	with	the	viewpoint	of	Learned	Hand	J	in	A	L	Smith	Iron	Co	v	Dickson:92	
The	ordinary	case	of	a	suit	by	a	licensee	against	an	infringer	is	in	no	sense	the	same	[as	an	
infringement	suit	by	an	exclusive	licensee].	It	is	indeed	true	that	a	mere	licensee	may	have	an	interest	
at	stake	in	such	a	suit;	his	license	may	be	worth	much	more	to	him	than	the	royalties	which	he	has	
agreed	to	pay,	and	its	value	will	ordinarily	depend	on	his	ability	to	suppress	the	competition	of	his	
rivals.	The	reason	why	he	is	not	permitted	to	sue	is	not	because	he	has	nothing	to	protect.	But	against	
that	interest	is	the	interest	of	the	infringer	to	be	immune	from	a	second	suit	by	the	owner	of	the	
patent...	Indeed,	the	owner	may	have	granted	a	number	of	licenses,	and	it	would	be	exceedingly	
oppressive	to	subject	him	to	the	will	of	all	his	licensees.	These	two	interests	in	combination	have	been	
held	to	overweigh	any	interest	of	the	licensee.93	
The	 definition	 of	 an	 ‘exclusive	 licence’	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 patent	 law,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 part	 4	
below,	differs	between	jurisdictions.	However,	exclusive	licences	also	have	universal,	uncontentious	
aspects.	 As	with	 non-exclusive	 licences,	 an	 exclusive	 licensor	 agrees	 not	 to	 exercise	 patent	 rights	
against	the	licensee,	but	the	pivotal	difference	between	exclusive	and	non-exclusive	licences	is	that,	
in	an	exclusive	 licence,	the	patentee	agrees	not	to	exploit	the	 invention	themselves,	nor	to	permit	
another	party	to	exploit	it.	A	corollary	of	this	is	that	a	patentee	to	a	panoplied	exclusive	licence,	has,	
at	 least	 for	 a	 period	 of	 time,	 chosen	 how	 the	 entirety	 of	 their	 patent	 rights	 will	 be	 exercised.	
Similarly,	 in	a	partitioned	exclusive	licence,	the	patentee	has	chosen	how	the	partitioned	elements	
of	their	rights	will	be	exercised.		
Bearing	these	differences	in	mind,	it	is	useful	to	analyse	partitioned	exclusive	licences	in	the	context	
of	Hand	J’s	reasoning	that	patent	standing	law	protects	‘two	interests’.	The	first	interest	his	Honour	
described	 is	 an	 infringer’s	 immunity	 from	multiple	 suits	 regarding	 the	 same	 potentially	 infringing	
																																								 																				
91	Sec.	13(1),	Sch.	1	(definition	of	‘exploit’)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth);	JTI	International	SA	v	Commonwealth	of	Australia	(2012)	
250	CLR	1,	30–2	French	CJ.	
92	A	L	Smith	Iron	Co	v.	Dickson,	141	F	2d	3	(2nd	Cir,	1944).	
93	A	L	Smith	Iron	Co	v.	Dickson,	141	F	2d	3,	6	(2nd	Cir,	1944).	
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conduct.	However,	this	interest	is	accounted	for	under	Sec	120(2)	of	the	Patents	Act	and	Rule	9.03	of	
the	Federal	Court	Rules	2011:	Sec.	120(2)	requires	that	exclusive	licensees	and	patentees	are	added	
to	 infringement	 actions;	 and	 Rule	 9.03,	 in	 a	 somewhat	 overlapping	 way,	 specifies	 that	 ‘[i]f	 an	
applicant	claims	relief	to	which	any	other	person	is	entitled	jointly	with	the	applicant…	every	person	
so	entitled	must	be	joined	as	a	party	to	the	proceeding’.94	Thus,	between	Sec.	120(2)	and	Rule	9.03,	
if	 an	 alleged	 infringer’s	 activities	 encroach	upon	 rights	 in	 a	 patent,	 then	 all	 the	 relevant	 licensees	
must	also	be	added,	and	there	is	no	chance	of	multiple	suits.	The	second	interest	described	by	Hand	
J	 is	 that	 licensee	 standing	 should	 not	 derogate	 from	 a	 patentee’s	 ability	 to	 licence	 other	 parties.	
Whilst	 this	 is	 clearly	a	vital	 issue	 for	patentees,	 in	 the	context	of	partitioned	exclusive	 rights	 in	an	
exclusive	 licence,	 the	 ability	 to	 licence	 the	 partitioned	 element	 to	 other	 parties	 is	 voluntarily	
foregone	by	the	patentee	when	the	licence	is	struck.	Thus,	this	interest	is	accounted	for	too.	
This	 analysis	 of	 interests	 protected	 by	 standing	 law,	 by	 itself,	 suggests	 that	 partitioned	 exclusive	
licensees	should	be	able	to	initiate	patent	infringement	actions,	but	it	does	not	necessarily	conclude	
the	issue.	This	is	especially	so	when	it	is	considered	that	patentees	control	remaining	patent	rights,	
have	an	interest	in	reversionary	rights,	have	standing,	and	could	enforce	patent	rights	on	behalf	of	
licensees.	However,	there	are	other	reasons,	legal,	economic,	and	practical,	that	support	partitioned	
exclusive	licensee	standing.	
The	patent	system	is	in	part	justified	by	its	ability	to	allocate	prospective	resources.95	In	practice,	this	
means	 that	by	being	awarded	patent	 rights,	a	patentee	 is	allocated	 the	exclusive	ability	 to	exploit	
the	invention	(these	exclusive	rights	are	designed	to	help	the	inventor	recoup	costs	expended	in	its	
development	 and	 commercialisation).96	 The	 ability	 to	 enforce	 these	 rights	 is	 also	 bestowed	 on	
patentees	 because	 without	 them	 the	 value	 of	 the	 allocated	 resource	 would	 be	 significantly	
diminished.97	 The	 significance	 of	 this	 reasoning	 surrounding	 the	 orthodox	 justifications	 for	 patent	
law	 flows	 through	 to	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees	 in	 two	 ways.	 First,	 if	 a	 partitioned	 exclusive	
licensee	cannot	enforce	 rights	 it	has	bargained	 for,	 then	 the	value	of	 the	 right	 is	 reduced	and	 the	
licensee	will	pay	 less	 for	the	right.	Second,	 it	 is	 logical	 that	a	party	who	 is	exclusively	permitted	to	
practise	 a	 partitioned	 element	 of	 a	 patented	 invention	 can	 choose	 how	 and	 when	 to	 enforce	 it	
because	 they	 are	 the	 party	 actually	 capitalising	 on	 the	 invention.	 It	 is	 helpful	 to	 illustrate	 this	
reasoning	with	a	practical	example.		
																																								 																				
94	Rule	9.03(a)	Federal	Court	Rules	2011	(Cth).	
95	Gans	et	al.	(2004),	pp.	437–8;	Landes	and	Posner,	(2003),	pp.	13,	20,	294–9;	Merges	et	al.	(2012),	pp.	11–3;	Kitch	(1977)	,	
p.	266.	
96	Gans	et	al.	(2004),	pp.	437–8;	Landes	and	Posner,	(2003),	pp.	294–7	cf.	326–32;	Merges	et	al.	(2012),	pp.	11–3.	
97	Gans	et	al.	(2004),	pp.	437–9;	Merges	et	al.	(2012),	pp.	11–3.	
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Division	of	labour	in	exploiting	patent	rights	means	that,	in	some	instances,	for	a	patentee	to	realise	
its	greatest	advantage	from	a	patent,	 it	will	need	to	create	exclusive	licences.	For	example,	a	party	
may	 have	 well-established	 distribution	 channels	 in	 a	 geographic	 area,	 or	 a	 party	 may	 have	
developed	goodwill	in	a	specific	field,	and	it	is	more	efficient	for	a	party	in	those	positions	to	practise	
the	invention.	Indeed,	in	Australia,	geographic	exclusive	licences	are	often	suited	to	purpose,	as	the	
layout	 of	 the	 country	 includes	 economically	 valuable	 areas	 separated	 by	 geographic	 boundaries	
(e.g.,	deserts,	bodies	of	water	or	large	distances).98	If	infringement	occurs	within	the	geographic	area	
of	a	partitioned	exclusive	licensee,	they	will	be	in	the	best	position	to	judge	whether	to	ignore	the	
infringing	 act,	 or	 choose	 to	 take	 other	 action,	 including	 threatening	 litigation.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	
patentee,	 the	 licensee	will	 normally	have	a	much	better	understanding	of	 the	market,	 its	 players,	
and,	 quite	 often,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 threat	 of	 litigation	will	 operate	 as	 a	 bargaining	 chip	 in	
negotiation.	 However,	 if	 a	 geographic	 exclusive	 licensee	 must	 co-ordinate	 infringement	 concerns	
through	 the	patentee,	 they	 incur	additional	 transaction	costs	and	 risk	a	 situation	where	 they	may	
not	be	able	to	enforce	the	exclusive	rights	they	bargained	for.	
3.2. Related	Legal	Aspects	
Although	 enabling	 efficient	 exploitation	 of	 partitioned	 patent	 rights	 is	 one	 element	 of	 standing,	
there	are	two	further	legal	aspects.	The	first	concerns	applications	for	relief	from	unjustified	threats	
of	infringement	proceedings.	These	applications	allow	parties	who	are	unjustifiably	threatened	with	
infringement	proceedings	to	recover	any	damages	that	the	threats	cause.99	This	aspect	of	patent	law	
is	 relevant	 because	 obiter	 statements	 from	 the	 High	 Court	 of	 Australia	 suggest	 that	 a	 threat	 of	
litigation	 by	 a	 licensee	without	 standing	would	 constitute	 an	 unjustified	 threat.100	 It	 follows	 then,	
that	if	the	threat	of	litigation	is	to	operate	as	a	bargaining	chip	in	negotiations	between	partitioned	
exclusive	 licensees	and	 infringers,	or	potential	 infringers,	 this	end	will	only	be	achieved	 if	 they	are	
legally	 allowed	 to	 make	 such	 threats.	 Otherwise,	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees	 will	 expose	
themselves	to	compensating	for	any	damage	their	threat	causes.101	
The	second	legal	ramification	of	current	standing	law	is	that	it	can	unfairly	curtail	damages	awards.	
To	explain	how	this	curtailment	occurs,	 it	 is	necessary	to	outline	how	licensees	can	use	patentee’s	
names	to	litigate	patents.	In	the	UK	government	report	leading	to	the	Patents	Act	1949,102	the	‘Swan	
																																								 																				
98	It	is	interesting	to	note	here	that	current	Australian	patent	law	specifically	allows	assignments	in	geographic	areas,	see	
Sec.	14(2)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
99	Sec.	128	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
100	Avel	Pty	Ltd	v.	Multicoin	Amusements	Pty	Ltd	(1990)	171	CLR	88,	94	Mason	CJ,	Deane	and	Gaudron	JJ,	105	Dawson	J.	
101	Sec.	128(3)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
102	Patents	Act	1949,	12,	13	&	14	Geo	6,	c	87.	
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Report’,103	 the	 Board	 of	 Trade	 noted	 that	 exclusive	 licences	 commonly	 include	 clauses	 to	 enable	
licensees	 to	 conduct	 infringement	 actions	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 patentee	 (at	 the	 time	 the	 Act	 only	
permitted	patentees	to	initiate	infringement	actions).104	If	litigation	is	conducted	via	this	mechanism	
and	 patent	 infringement	 is	 proved,	 the	 successful	 litigants	 have	 a	 choice	 between	 an	 account	 of	
profits	 and	 damages.105	 While	 an	 account	 of	 profits	 calculation	 is	 the	 same	 regardless	 of	 whose	
name	the	litigation	is	conducted	under,	a	damages	calculation	is	not;	it	is	based	on	the	harm	done	to	
the	successful,	named	litigant.106	This	means	that,	depending	on	the	licence	agreement,	a	damages	
award	might	 be	 relatively	 low,	 even	 though	 the	 actual	 damage	 to	 the	 exclusive	 licensee	 is	much	
higher.107	This	could	arise,	for	example,	under	a	scenario	where	the	exclusive	 licensee	makes	 lump	
sum	payments	to	the	patentee	that	are	not	connected	to	sales	of	the	invention,	or	when	a	patentee	
company	creates	a	partitioned	exclusive	licence	with	a	subsidiary	company	in	exchange	for	nominal	
consideration.	
3.3. Arguments	Against	Standing	for	Partitioned	Exclusive	Licensees	
An	argument	 against	 standing	 for	 partitioned	exclusive	 licensees	 is	 that,	 in	 theory,	 it	 allows	more	
than	two	parties	to	initiate	infringement	actions.	This	could	be	problematic	for	a	number	of	reasons,	
including	what	happens	if	one	or	more	parties	do	not	want	to	initiate	a	suit,	or,	if	the	infringement	
action	 is	 successful,	 how	 relief	 is	 distributed.	 However,	while	 these	 issues	may	 be	more	 complex	
because	more	than	two	parties	are	involved,	they	are	no	different	than	when	a	panoplied	exclusive	
licence	 is	 established.	 Whether	 there	 is	 only	 one	 exclusive	 licensee	 and	 a	 patentee,	 or	 multiple	
exclusive	licensees	and	a	patentee,	forethought	is	required	on	how	litigation	may	be	conducted	and	
how	financial	relief	should	be	distributed.		
Related	to	the	negotiation	of	licences	are	also	various	practical	business	considerations	that	operate	
against	 large	 numbers	 of	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees.	 From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 a	 patentee,	
dividing	 patent	 rights	 increases	 negotiation	 and	 other	 transaction	 costs	 and,	 for	 many	 licensees,	
efficient	 and	 efficacious	 exploitation	 will	 often	 overlap	 with	 the	 ability	 to	 utilise	 a	 significant	
proportion	of	rights	conferred	in	a	patent.	For	example,	manufacturers	will	often	be	sellers,	and	will	
want	to	distribute	across	the	entire	patent	area	and	in	all	fields-of-use.	Notably,	as	explored	further	
																																								 																				
103	Board	of	Trade	(1947).	
104	Id.,	29.	
105	Sec.	122(1)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
106	Colbeam	Palmer	Ltd	v.	Stock	Affiliates	Pty	Ltd	(1968)	122	CLR	25,	32.	
107	Board	of	Trade	(1947),	p.	29;	see	also,	Intellectual	Propery	Committee	of	the	Business	Law	Section	of	the	Law	Council	of	
Australia,	(2015),	pp.	4–5.	
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below,	partitioned	exclusive	 licensees	can	 initiate	 infringement	proceedings	 in	the	US	and	UK,	and	
no	commentary	has	specifically	attributed	problems	to	them	doing	so.108	
A	 more	 general	 concern	 with	 patent	 law	 is	 that	 patent	 rights	 may	 be	 enforced	 in	 ways	 which	
undermine	 its	 aim	 as	 a	 welfare	 enhancing	 tool.	 Here,	 the	 conduct	 of	 various	 patent	 assertion	
entities,	 or	 to	 use	 the	 pejorative	 term,	 ‘trolls’,	 is	 a	 relevant	 issue.109	 Arguably,	 by	 limiting	
enforcement	of	patents	to	panoplied	exclusive	licensees,	some	undesirable	conduct	may	be	avoided.	
However,	 limiting	 behaviour	 by	 confining	 enforcement	 to	 certain	 types	 of	 exclusive	 licensees	 is	 a	
blunt	means	to	achieve	such	ends,	especially	when	such	activity	has	not	been	linked	to	partitioned	
exclusive	licences.	
The	analysis	 so	 far	has	not	distinguished	between	different	 types	of	partitioned	exclusive	 licences	
and,	generally	speaking,	most	reasoning	concerning	partitioned	exclusive	licences	applies	equally	to	
all	 three.	However,	 a	 semantic	difference	between	activity-based	exclusive	 licences	 and	 the	other	
two	partitioned	exclusive	 licences	 is	 that	activity-based	exclusive	 licences	wholly	allocate	 separate	
activities	under	 the	definition	of	 ‘exploit’,	whereas	 the	other	 two	 subdivide	 the	activities.	What	 is	
meant	by	 this	 is	 that,	 if	 a	geographic	exclusive	 licence	 is	established	 in	each	 state	of	Australia,	 six	
parties	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 sell,	 import,	 offer	 for	 sale	 etc.,	 the	 patented	 invention.	With	 multiple	
activity-based	exclusive	licences,	only	one	party	has	the	ability	to	make	or	import	etc.	the	invention.	
It	 follows	 that	 there	 is	 legal	 simplicity	 to	 prohibiting	 geographic	 or	 field-of-use	 exclusive	 licensees	
from	 having	 standing	 because	 they	 ‘share’	 an	 activity,	 or	 prohibiting	 activity-based	 exclusive	
licensees	from	having	standing	because	they	cannot	perform	all	the	activities	under	the	definition	of	
‘exploit’.	However,	there	are	three	arguments	that	run	against	both	of	these	propositions.	
First,	 patent	 rights	 have	 always	 been	 able	 to	 be	 split.	 Like	 other	 forms	 of	 personal	 property,110	
patents	 can	 be	 granted	 to	more	 than	 one	 party	 and	 they	 can	 be	 assigned	 in	 moieties,	 either	 as	
tenants-in-common	or	in	joint	tenancy.111	Unless	there	is	a	reason	to	distinguish	between	the	rights	
of	owners	and	partitioned	exclusive	licensees	at	standing,	this	distinction	is	unwarranted.		
Second,	from	the	economic	justification	described	above,	the	incentive	rationale	for	patents	is	based	
on	exclusivity.	In	Australia,	the	activities	described	in	the	definition	of	‘exploit’	are	only	‘examples’	of	
																																								 																				
108	As	explored	in	pt	II	A	below,	in	the	US	there	is	currently	a	level	of	confusion	associated	with	standing	in	patent	law.	
However,	this	is	directed	to	when	exclusive	licensees	can	initiate	infringement	proceedings	without	the	patentee	—	this	is	
something	that	is	not	permitted	under	the	Patents	Act	and	not	investigated	in	this	article.	Despite	this,	as	a	general	rule,	in	
the	US	partitioned	exclusive	licensees	can	initiate	infringement	proceedings	with	patentees	named	as	co-plaintiffs,	and	no	
problems	have	been	specifically	attributed	to	it.	
109	See,	e.g.,	Bessen	and	Meurer	(2012),	pp.	24–5.	
110	Sec.	13(2)	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).	
111	Sec.	s	16	Patents	Act	1990	(Cth).;	Walton	v.	Lavater	(1860)	141	ER	1127,	1132–3	Erle	CJ.	
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what	the	word	means	—	they	are	not	rights.112	Thus,	focusing	on	whether	a	party	or	parties	control	
an	activity	 that	 is	not	a	 right	 in	 itself,	 just	an	example	of	what	 ‘exploit’	means,	 is	artificial	and	has	
limited	logical	connection	to	the	justifications	for	patent	rights.		
Third,	 in	 relation	 to	 field-of-use	 exclusive	 licences,	 a	 single	 patent	 often	 consists	 of	 different	
applications	 for	 the	 same	 invention.	 For	 example,	 a	 single	 patent	 to	 non-naturally	 occurring	 DNA	
could	 include	 claims	 for	 use	 of	 the	 DNA	 in	 human	 diagnostics,	 scientific	 equipment,	 and	 human	
therapeutics.	Under	the	current	operation	of	Australian	patent	law,	partitioned	exclusive	licences	to	
each	specific	field	listed	would	not	carry	standing.	However,	as	separate	claims	must	each	satisfy	the	
requirements	for	grant,	when	applying	for	patent	protection	the	applicant	could	have	separated	the	
different	claims	 into	three	separate	applications.	The	benefit	 to	a	patentee	 in	these	circumstances	
would	 be	 that	 they	 could	 create	 panoplied	 exclusive	 licences	 to	 each	 patent.	 Thus,	 preventing	
patentees	 from	 creating	 multiple	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licences	 that	 carry	 standing	 is	 somewhat	
artificial.	The	three	partitioned	exclusive	licences	could,	in	theory,	be	panoplied	exclusive	licences	to	
three	separate	patents.	Indeed,	the	single	patent	scenario	is	preferable	because	it	reduces	work	for	
examiners,	 saves	 the	 patentee	 money	 and	 does	 not	 require	 patentees	 to	 make	 significant	
commercialisation	decisions	before	commencing	the	application	process.		
3.4. Summary	on	Jurisprudence	&	Justifications	
A	related	issue	with	any	type	of	purported	exclusive	licence	is	that	it	may	not	actually	be	exclusive.	
By	 this,	 it	 is	meant	 that	 the	 licensee	cannot	exclude	all	 third	parties	 from	practising	 the	 invention	
because	some	third	parties	have	separate	permission	from	the	patentee	to	practise	the	invention.	In	
circumstances	 of	multiple	 field-of-use	 exclusive	 licences	 that	 emanate	 from	 the	 same	patent,	 this	
issue	may	 be	 particularly	 problematic.	 This	 can	 be	 demonstrated	 using	 the	 simplistic	 example	 of	
commercialising	 an	 non-naturally	 occurring	 DNA	 patent	 described	 above.	 When	 purportedly	
exclusive	 field-of-use	 licences	 are	 drafted	 to	 each	 area,	 that	 is,	 human	 diagnostics,	 scientific	
equipment,	 and	 human	 therapy,	 it	 is	 quite	 possible	 that	 they	 could	 be	 interpreted	 to	 have	
overlapping	interests.	For	example,	a	genetic	diagnostic	test	may	also	be	useful	to	optimise	human	
therapy.	It	 is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article	to	canvas	drafting	techniques	to	ensure	exclusivity	or	
critique	contractual	interpretation	in	this	area,	but	the	broader	issue	of	exclusivity	is	a	problem.	To	
this	extent,	 following	the	conclusions	reached	above,	the	test	that	should	be	applied	to	determine	
whether	a	licensee	has	standing	is	whether	they	have	an	interest	amounting	to	an	exclusive	sphere	
within	the	concept	of	‘exploit’.		
																																								 																				
112	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(No	5)	(2013)	104	IPR	23,	106;	Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co	v.	Apotex	Pty	Ltd	(2015)	
228	FCR	1,	33.	
	 20	
The	examination	of	partitioned	exclusive	 licences	 in	this	part	suggests	that	there	are	no	aspects	of	
them	that	undermine	Blair	and	Cotter’s	three	assumptions.	Of	particular	note,	no	economic,	legal	or	
business	related	rationale	undermines	the	third	assumption	that	patent	rights	should	not	have	their	
value	diminished	based	on	the	way	they	are	 transferred.	The	 foregoing	analysis	also	suggests	 that	
where	a	licensee	is	exclusively	permitted	to	exercise	an	invention	but	is	not	permitted	to	enforce	it	
in	their	own	name,	the	exclusivity	they	have	bargained	for	 is	devalued,	thereby	also	devaluing	the	
patent	 itself.	 Permitting	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees	 to	 enforce	 patents	 gives	 them	 the	
opportunity	 to	 choose	 how	 to	 exploit	 resources	 in	 a	 market	 economy.	 At	 its	 core,	 this	 type	 of	
explanation	 supports	 the	 resource	 allocation	 justifications	 underpinning	 patent	 law.	 Unnecessary	
restrictions	 on	 the	 ability	 to	 enforce	 patent	 rights	 creates	 additional	 transaction	 costs	 and	
unnecessary	 hurdles	 for	 licensees,	 and	 may	 prevent	 licensees	 and	 patentees	 from	 capturing	 the	
benefits	the	patent	system	is	designed	to	confer.	
From	 this	 economic	 point	 of	 view,	 this	 inquiry	 also	 reveals	 that	 focusing	 on	 how	 a	 given	 statute	
defines	 ‘exclusive	 licensee’	 or	 ‘patent	 area’	 is	 irrelevant	when	determining	 standing,	 and	distracts	
from	the	real	question	of	what	is	the	correct	level	of	legal	interest	that	should	confer	standing.	The	
real	and	substantial	question	is	whether	a	licensee	exclusively	exercises	a	sphere	of	patent	rights.	By	
corollary	this	analysis	also	suggests	that	standing	to	initiate	infringement	actions	in	Australian	patent	
law	is	currently	flawed.	The	next	part	of	this	article	examines	whether	this	flaw	is	common	to	other	
jurisdictions	or	unique	to	Australia.		
4. Foreign	Comparisons	
4.1. US		
Standing	to	 initiate	patent	 infringement	suits	 in	the	US	 is	dictated	by	what	 is	known	as	 ‘prudential	
standing’.113	 In	a	way,	prudential	 standing	 is	more	dynamic	 than	standing	 law	 in	Australian	patent	
law	because	it	can	permit	exclusive	licensees	to	begin	litigation	without	the	patentee	being	added	to	
the	 action	 if	 they	 control	 ‘all	 substantial	 rights’	 in	 a	 patent	 and	 are	 found	 to	 be	 equivalent	 to	 an	
assignee.114	It	also	confers	standing	on	exclusive	licensees	when	they	control	less	than	‘all	substantial	
rights’,	 provided	 the	 remaining	 substantial	 rights	 are	 represented	 in	 the	 suit,	 which	 is	 usually	
																																								 																				
113	Cf.	‘Constitutional	standing’,	see,	Intellectual	Property	Developers	Inc	v.	TCI	Cablevision	of	California	Inc,	248	F	3d	1333,	
1348	(Fed	Cir,	2001);	Totes-Isotoner	Corp	v.	United	States,	594	F	3d	1346,	1352	(Fed	Cir,	2010);	Lujan	v.	Defenders	of	
Wildlife,	504	US	555,	560–61	(1992).	
114	Prima	Tek	II	LLC	v.	A-Roo	Co,	222	F	3d	1372,	1377	(Fed	Cir,	2000);	Alfred	E	Mann	Foundation	for	Scientific	Research	v.	
Cochlear	Corp,	604	F	3d	1354,	1358–9	(Fed	Cir,	2010).	
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achieved	by	adding	the	patentee.115	Despite	its	apparent	simplicity,	prudential	standing	has	recently	
been	 described	 by	 a	 number	 of	 commentators	 as	 ‘contradictory’,	 ‘confusing’,	 ‘discretionary’,	 and	
‘incoherent’.116	These	descriptors,	however,	are	specifically	targeted	towards	the	use	of	prudential	
standing	in	circumstances	where	a	licensee	can	sue	by	themselves.117	Related	to	this	issue,	in	Alfred	
E	Mann	Foundation	 for	 Scientific	Research	v	Cochlear	Corp,118	 the	Federal	Circuit	non-exhaustively	
listed	nine	different	elements	of	a	licence	that	need	to	be	considered	when	evaluating	whether	the	
licensee	has	‘all	the	substantial	rights’.119	 It	 is	not	the	point	of	this	article	to	offer	a	perspective	on	
this	 issue,	although	 it	 is	noted	that	commentators	have	suggested	reform	 is	needed.120	Rather,	on	
point	with	the	inquiry	in	this	article,	it	can	be	observed	from	the	morass	of	case	law	that	partitioned	
exclusive	licensees	do	have	standing	if	the	patentee	is	joined	in	the	suit.		
The	 statutory	basis	 in	 the	US	 for	 standing	 to	 initiate	 infringement	proceedings	 is	 that	 a	 ‘patentee	
shall	have	remedy	by	civil	action	for	infringement	of	his	patent’.121	Patentee	is	defined	to	include	the	
patentee	as	well	 as	 the	 successors	 in	 title	 to	 the	patentee,	 but	no	 reference	 is	made	 to	exclusive	
licensees.122	With	regard	to	exclusive	rights,	US	patent	law	confers	the	ability	to	make,	use,	sell	(or	
offer	to	sell),	and	import	the	invention	in	the	US.123		
In	the	1926	Supreme	Court	case	Independent	Wireless	Telegraph	Co	v	Radio	Corp	of	America,124	the	
unanimous	Court	found	that	a	partitioned	exclusive	licensee	had	standing	to	initiate	an	infringement	
action.125	Yet,	the	analysis	that	lead	to	this	outcome	is	quite	different	from	analysis	in	Australian	law.	
The	patent	 in	question	was	to	 ‘devices	 for	amplifying	 feeble	electric	currents	and	certain	new	and	
useful	improvements	in	space	telegraphy’.126	The	licensee	was	granted	the	exclusive	right	to	use	and	
sell	the	invention	but	not	make	it.127	Moreover,	the	licensee	was	only	granted	these	rights	for	‘radio	
purposes’,128	when	the	invention	itself	could	be	put	to	a	range	of	other	uses,	including	telephony.129	
At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 decision,	 it	 was	 not	 clear	 how	 and	 when	 exclusive	 licensees	 could	 initiate	
infringement	 actions.	 Accordingly,	much	 of	 the	 reasoning	 in	 Independent	Wireless	 Telegraph	 Co	 v	
																																								 																				
115	Prima	Tek	II	LLC	v.	A-Roo	Co,	222	F	3d	1372,	1377	(Fed	Cir,	2000);	Alfred	E	Mann	Foundation	for	Scientific	Research	v.	
Cochlear	Corp,	604	F	3d	1354,	1359	(Fed	Cir,	2010);	Intellectual	Property	Developers	Inc	v.	TCI	Cablevision	of	California	Inc,	
248	F	3d	1333,	1346–7	(Fed	Cir,	2001).	
116	Greene	(2012–2013),	pp,	1–5;	Nguyen	(2013–2014),	pp.	20–1,	28–9.	
117	See,	Greene	(2012–2013);	Nguyen	(2013–2014).	
118	Alfred	E	Mann	Foundation	for	Scientific	Research	v.	Cochlear	Corp,	604	F	3d	1354	(Fed	Cir,	2010).	
119	Alfred	E	Mann	Foundation	for	Scientific	Research	v.	Cochlear	Corp,	604	F	3d	1354,	1360–1	(Fed	Cir,	2010).	
120	See	generally,	Greene	(2012–2013);	Nguyen	(2013–2014).	
121	35	USC	§	281.	
122	35	USC	§	100(d).	For	conditions	on	assignments,	see	35	USC	§	261.	
123	35	USC	§	154(a)(1).	
124	Independent	Wireless	Telegraph	Co	v.	Radio	Corp	of	America,	269	US	459,	461–464	(1926).	
125	Independent	Wireless	Telegraph	Co	v.	Radio	Corp	of	America,	269	US	459,	475	(1926).	
126	Independent	Wireless	Telegraph	Co	v.	Radio	Corp	of	America,	269	US	459,	461	(1926).	
127	Ibid.	
128	Ibid.	
129	US	Patent	841,387.	
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Radio	Corp	of	America	concerned	how	and	when	exclusive	licensees	could	use	a	patentee’s	name	to	
enforce	a	patent	and	when	 they	could	use	 their	own.	This	 last	point	was	of	particular	 importance	
because	the	patentee	 in	 this	case	was	not	available.130	 Interestingly,	 the	approach	adopted	by	 the	
Supreme	Court	was	in	part	based	on	the	law	of	trusts.131	Relevantly,	their	Honours	stated	that:	
It	seems	clear	then	on	principle	and	authority	that	the	owner	of	a	patent	who	grants	to	another	the	
exclusive	right	to	make,	use	or	vend	the	invention,	which	does	not	constitute	a	statutory	assignment,	
holds	the	title	to	the	patent	in	trust	for	such	a	licensee,	to	the	extent	that	he	must	allow	the	use	of	his	
name	as	plaintiff	in	any	action	brought	at	the	instance	of	the	licensee	in	law	or	in	equity	to	obtain	
damages	for	the	injury	to	this	exclusive	right	by	an	infringer	or	to	enjoin	infringement	of	it.132	
Continuing	 this	 reasoning,	 the	 Court	 found	 that	 in	 absence	 of	 the	 patentee,	 equity	 allowed	 the	
exclusive	licensee	to	use	their	own	name	and	join	the	patentee	without	their	consent.		
In	 the	 intervening	 time,	 relatively	 well	 articulated	 rules	 for	 exclusive	 licensee	 standing	 have	
developed.133	 In	 Amgen	 Inc	 v	 Chugai	 Pharmaceutical	 Co	 Ltd,134	 after	 reviewing	 case	 law	 Young	 J	
stated,	‘[a]	licensee	can	be	deemed	exclusive	…	where	the	licensee	has	obtained	only	the	exclusive	
right	to	sell	the	patented	invention’	and	more	generally	that,	‘an	exclusive	license	can	be	created	by	
a	grant	of	exclusivity	based	solely	on	geographic,	time	or	field-of-use	 limitations.’135	This	reasoning	
was	 reviewed	 on	 appeal	 in	 Ortho	 Pharmaceutical	 Corp	 v	 Genetics	 Institute136	 where	 it	 was	
unanimously	affirmed.137	Nies	J,	writing	for	the	Court,	expanded	on	the	rationale	first	expounded	by	
Hand	J	in	A	L	Smith	Iron	Co	v	Dickson	(extracted	above),	stating:	
To	have	co-plaintiff	standing	in	an	infringement	suit,	a	licensee	must	hold	some	of	the	proprietary	
sticks	from	the	bundle	of	patent	rights,	albeit	a	lesser	share	of	rights	in	the	patent	than	for	an	
assignment	and	standing	to	sue	alone.	…		
The	proprietary	rights	granted	by	any	patent	are	the	rights	to	exclude	others	from	making,	using	or	
selling	the	invention	in	the	United	States.	A	patent	license	may	have	the	effect	between	the	parties	to	
the	license	of	transferring	some	of	those	proprietary	rights	from	the	patentee	to	its	licensee.	Such	
license	then	does	more	than	provide	a	covenant	not	to	sue,	i.e.,	a	‘bare’	license.	In	addition,	the	
license	makes	the	licensee	a	beneficial	owner	of	some	identifiable	part	of	the	patentee's	bundle	of	
rights	to	exclude	others.	Thus,	a	licensee	with	proprietary	rights	in	the	patent	is	generally	called	an	
‘exclusive’	licensee.	But	it	is	the	licensee's	beneficial	ownership	of	a	right	to	prevent	others	from	
																																								 																				
130	Independent	Wireless	Telegraph	Co	v.	Radio	Corp	of	America,	269	US	459,	472	(1926).	
131	See	generally,	ibid.	
132	Independent	Wireless	Telegraph	Co	v.	Radio	Corp	of	America,	269	US	459,	469	(1926)..	
133	Blair	and	Cotter	(1999–2000),	pp.	1347–50.	
134	Amgen	Inc	v.	Chugai	Pharmaceutical	Co	Ltd,	808	F	Supp	894	(D	Mass,	1992).	
135	Amgen	Inc	v.	Chugai	Pharmaceutical	Co	Ltd,	808	F	Supp	894,	900	(D	Mass,	1992).	
136	Ortho	Pharmaceutical	Corp	v.	Genetics	Institute	Inc,	52	F	3d	1026,	1033–4	(Fed	Cir,	1995).	
137	Ibid.	
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making,	using	or	selling	the	patented	technology	that	provides	the	foundation	for	co-plaintiff	
standing…138	
From	this	 commentary,	 it	 is	 relatively	clear	 that	US	patent	 law	recognises	 standing	 for	partitioned	
exclusive	licensees.139	It	is	also	interesting	to	note	that	the	reasoning	of	the	Federal	Circuit	in	Ortho	
Pharmaceutical	 Corp	 v	 Genetics	 Institute	 resonates	 with	 the	 economic	 justifications	 for	 standing	
elucidated	above,	albeit,	as	the	extracts	indicate,	more	from	a	property	and	trust	law	point	of	view.		
4.2. UK	
To	properly	understand	UK	standing	law,	one	must	first	have	reference	to	litigation	under	the	now	
repealed	 Patents	 Act	 1949.	 In	 the	 1956	 case,	Re	 Courtaulds	 Ltd’s	 Application	 for	 Extension	 of	 the	
Term	of	Letters	Patent	No	511,160	 (‘Courtaulds	Application’),140	Lloyd-Jacob	J	commented	that	 the	
definition	 of	 ‘exclusive	 licensee’	 in	 the	 Patents	 Act	 1949,	 ‘would	 permit	 a	 plurality	 of	 exclusive	
licensees	 to	 be	 created	 in	 respect	 of	 any	 one	 patent	 monopoly’.141	 Since	 the	 Act	 specified	 that	
exclusive	 licensees	 could	 initiate	 infringement	 suits,142	 this	 suggests	 that	 partitioned	 exclusive	
licensees	 had	 standing	 to	 initiate	 infringement	 proceedings.	 However,	Courtaulds	Application	was	
not	 decided	on	whether	 a	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensee	had	 standing	 but	whether	 the	 applicants	
were	 actually	 in	 possession	 of	 a	 licence.143	 Since	 Lloyd-Jacob	 J’s	 found	 the	 applicants	were	 not	 in	
possession	of	a	licence,144	his	Honour’s	comments	are	therefore	obiter.		
Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 two	 additional	 elements	 that	 make	 Lloyd-Jacob	 J’s	 interpretation	
uncontroversial.	First,	the	Board	of	Trade	in	the	Swan	Report	specifically	stated	that	the	definition	of	
exclusive	 licensee	 is	 to	 include	 ‘any	 person	 who	 has	 the	 sole	 and	 exclusive	 right	 to	 work	 the	
invention	in	any	particular	field	of	its	application	or	in	any	particular	geographical	area’.145	Further,	
the	 report	 stated	 that,	 ‘an	 exclusive	 licensee…	 has	 been	 promised	 immunity	 from…	 	 [otherwise]	
legitimate	competition	as	would	spring	from	the	grant	of	additional	 licences.	He	 is	plainly	entitled,	
therefore,	 to	 demand	 protection	 against	 illegitimate	 competition	 of	 infringers.’146	 Second,	 the	
Patents	Act	1949	defined	exclusive	 licensee	 to	mean,	 ‘a	 licence	 from	a	patentee	which	confers	on	
the	licensee,	or	on	the	licensee	and	persons	authorised	by	him,	to	the	exclusion	of	all	other	persons	
																																								 																				
138	Ortho	Pharmaceutical	Corp	v.	Genetics	Institute	Inc,	52	F	3d	1026,	1031–2	(Fed	Cir,	1995);	an	appeal	to	the	Supreme	
Court	was	denied,	see,	Ortho	Pharmaceutical	Corp	v.	Genetics	Institute	Inc,	516	US	907	(1995);	see	also	WiAV	Solutions	LLC	
v.	Motorola	Inc,	631	F	3d	1257,	1266	(2010).		
139	See	also,	Blair	and	Cotter	(1999–2000),	p.	1347.	
140	Re	Courtaulds	Ltd’s	Application	for	Extension	of	the	Term	of	the	Letters	Patent	No	511,160	[1956]	RPC	208.	
141	Re	Courtaulds	Ltd’s	Application	for	Extension	of	the	Term	of	the	Letters	Patent	No	511,160	[1956]	RPC	208,	210.	
142	Sect.	63(1)	Patents	Act	1949,	12,	13	&	14	Geo	6,	c	87.	
143	Ibid.	
144	Ibid.		
145	Board	of	Trade	(1947),	p.	30.	
146	Ibid.	
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(including	 the	 patentee),	 any	 right	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 patented	 invention,	 and	 "exclusive	 licensee"	
shall	be	construed	accordingly.’147	 In	this	passage,	 the	phrase	 ‘any	right	 in	respect	of	 the	patented	
invention’	suggests	multiplicity.		
Under	current	UK	patent	legislation,	the	Patents	Act	1977,148	standing	to	initiate	patent	infringement	
proceedings	 is	 now	 specified	 in	 Sects.	 61(1)	 and	67(1).	 Sect.	 61(1)	 specifies	 that	 ‘civil	 proceedings	
may	be	brought	 in	 the	court	by	 the	proprietor	of	a	patent	…’149	and	Sect.	67(1)	 specifies	 that	 ‘the	
holder	 of	 an	 exclusive	 licence	 under	 a	 patent	 shall	 have	 the	 same	 right	 as	 the	 proprietor	 of	 the	
patent	to	bring	proceedings	in	respect	of	any	infringement	of	the	patent	committed	after	the	date	of	
the	licence’.150	‘Exclusive	licensee’	is	defined	to	mean:	
a	licence	from	the	proprietor	of	or	applicant	for	a	patent	conferring	on	the	licensee,	or	on	him	and	
persons	authorised	by	him,	to	the	exclusion	of	all	other	persons	(including	the	proprietor	or	
applicant),	any	right	in	respect	of	the	invention	to	which	the	patent	or	application	relates,	and	
‘exclusive	licensee’	and	‘non-exclusive	licence’	shall	be	construed	accordingly.151	
The	passage,	‘any	right	in	respect	of	the	invention	to	which	the	patent	or	application	relates’,	echoes	
the	earlier	definition.		
In	 cases	 under	 the	 new	 Act,	 none	 have	 cited	 the	 Swan	 Report	 or	 Courtaulds	 Application.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 law	 appears	 to	 operate	 in	 the	 same	 way.	 In	 Dendron	 GmbH	 v	 University	 of	
California	(No	3),152	the	claimant	applied	to	have	a	party	added	to	an	infringement/revocation	action	
on	the	basis	that	they	were	an	‘exclusive	licensee’.153	The	claimant	wanted	to	add	the	party	for	the	
purpose	 of	 obtaining	 discovery	 from	 them.154	 In	 the	 course	 of	 his	 Honour’s	 decision,	 Pumfrey	 J	
stated	 that	 ‘separate	 exclusive	 licences	 can,	 to	 all	 appearances,	 be	 granted	 in	 respect	 of	 distinct	
rights	 under	 a	 patent.	 Thus,	 for	 example	 it	 seems	 clear	 that	 separate	 exclusive	 licences	 may	 be	
granted	to	manufacture	and	to	 import	a	patented	product.’155	However,	this	case	was	not	decided	
on	whether	 the	third	party	was	a	 type	of	exclusive	 licensee	and	should	therefore	be	added	to	the	
action;	rather,	it	was	on	whether	the	party	exclusively	controlled	any	patent	rights.156	Since,	Pumfrey	
J’s	 found	 the	party	 in	question	did	not	exercise	any	exclusive	 rights,157	his	Honour’s	 comments	on	
partitioned	 licensee	 standing	 are	 obiter	 too.	 Nevertheless,	 from	 the	 analysis	 presented	 here,	 a	
																																								 																				
147	Sec.	101	(definition	of	‘exclusive	licensee’)	(emphasis	added)	Patents	Act	1949,	12,	13	&	14	Geo	6,	c	87.	
148	Patents	Act	1977	(UK)	c	37.	
149	Id.,	Sec.	61(1).	
150	Id.,	Sec.	67(1).	
151	Id.,	Sec.	130.	
152	Dendron	GmbH	v.	University	of	California	(No	3)	[2004]	FSR	43.	
153	Dendron	GmbH	v.	University	of	California	(No	3)	[2004]	FSR	43	[1].	
154	Ibid.	
155	Dendron	GmbH	v.	University	of	California	(No	3)	[2004]	FSR	43	[25].	
156	Dendron	GmbH	v.	University	of	California	(No	3)	[2004]	FSR	43	[23]–[26].	
157	Ibid.	
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consistent	 line	of	 reasoning	 indicating	 that	partitioned	exclusive	 licensees	do	have	 standing	under	
the	UK	Act	does	exist.158	
4.3. Summary	on	US	and	UK	Standing	Law	
The	 examination	 of	 US	 and	UK	 standing	 law	 provided	 in	 this	 part	 demonstrates	 that	 both	 patent	
regimes	 confer,	 or	 are	 likely	 to	 confer,	 standing	 on	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees.	 This	 outcome	
weighs	 in	 favour	 of	 broadening	Australian	 standing	 law	 to	 include	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees,	
however,	 it	 also	 has	 more	 specific	 outcomes	 for	 patent	 harmonisation.	 A	 central	 goal	 of	
harmonisation	is	to	reduce	patent	related	costs	by	making	consistent	laws	between	countries.159	In	
this	context,	there	are	a	number	of	costs	associated	with	partitioned	exclusive	licensees	not	having	
standing,	all	which	can	be	demonstrated	in	the	example	of	a	company	that	manufactures	a	patented	
product	in	one	jurisdiction	and	uses	activity-based	exclusive	licensees	to	import	and	sell	the	product	
in	others.	In	jurisdictions	that	do	not	grant	standing	to	partitioned	exclusive	licensees,	the	licensees	
may	 encounter	 additional	 transaction	 costs	 associated	with	 enforcement	 in	 the	 patentee’s	 name,	
including	a	reduced	amount	of	damages,	or	prohibition	from	enforcing	the	patent.	In	addition,	costs	
in	the	global	exploitation	of	patents	will	be	 increased	by	requiring	 legal	advice	on	an	 issue	that,	as	
demonstrated	above,	has	no	compelling	reason	for	its	existence.		
5. Conclusion	
The	 legal	 and	economic	 reasoning	presented	 in	 this	 article	 provides	 significant	 support	 for	 patent	
law	 providing	 standing	 to	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees.	 In	 particular,	 the	 ability	 for	 partitioned	
exclusive	licensees	to	choose	how	and	when	infringement	is	initiated	aligns	with	the	patent	regime’s	
role	 in	 incentivising	 innovation	 and	 complements	 the	 role	 of	 patents	 in	 a	 market	 economy.	 This	
conclusion	 aligns	 with	 the	 recommendation	 from	 the	 Intellectual	 Property	 Committee	 of	 the	
Business	 Law	 Section	 of	 the	 Law	 Council	 of	 Australia,	 who	 emphasised	 the	 adverse	 commercial	
ramifications	of	the	current	law.160	Conferring	standing	on	partitioned	exclusive	licensees	would	also	
harmonise	 Australian	 law	 with	 key	 trading	 partners.	 This	 position,	 however,	 is	 the	 diametric	
opposite	of	Australia’s	current	patent	standing	law.	It	is	possible	that	a	future	High	Court	of	Australia	
decision	 could	 establish	 that	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees	 do	 have	 standing	 under	 the	 current	
wording	of	 the	Patents	Act.	However,	 this	 seems	 to	be	a	 rather	 ineffective	method	 to	change	 the	
law:	 it	 is	 speculative,	 would	 take	 years	 and	 would	 involve	 litigants	 risking	 much.	 Law	 reform	 by	
																																								 																				
158	See	also,	Bondax	Carpets	Ltd	v.	Advance	Carpet	Tiles	[1993]	FSR	162;	SDL	Hair	Ltd	.v	Next	Row	Ltd	[2013]	EWPCC	31	(14	
June	2013);	PCUK	v.	Diamond	Shamrock	Industrial	Chemical	Ltd	[1981]	FSR	427.	
159	B+	Sub-Group	(2015),	p.	2;	Phillips	(2015).		
160	Intellectual	Propery	Committee	of	the	Business	Law	Section	of	the	Law	Council	of	Australia,	(2015),	pp.	13-4.	
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legislative	means	 seems	much	more	 logical	—	 the	 next	 round	 of	 amendments	 to	 the	Patents	 Act	
should	include	reform	of	standing	law.	
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